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MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

EQUITY-JURISDICTION TO ENJOIN AcTS oF A FEDERAL OFFICER IN
ExcEss OF STATUTORY AUTHORITY-As a device for recovering excessive
profits, federal legislation authorized the Secretary of War to order concerns
holding contracts with the government to withhold and pay over to the government amounts due from them to parties against which the excessive profits

RECENT DECISIONS

had been determined.1 Acting under this authority, the Secretary ordered
twelve government contractors to withhold sums due or to become due to
plaintiff, of which they were customers, after a determination against the plaintiff of $7,000,000 in excessive profits. Plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant from
using this means of collection, contending that because the order was not limited to amounts already due on subcontracts for government work, it was in
excess of his statutory authority. Defendant moved to dismiss, on the ground
that plaintiff stated no basis for equitable jurisdiction. Held, motion denied.
Plaintiff has a right to test the validity of the withholding order. Its remedy at
law is inadequate, because a multiplicity of actions against its customers would
be required, impairing its business relationships. Lord Mfg. Co. v. Stimson,
(D.C. D.C. 1947) 73 F. Supp. 984.
As an instrument for testing the constitutionality of statutes, the suit for an
injunction against enforcement is well established. Wherever the plaintiff
presents a case or controversy, the federal courts usually seem willing to assume
jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief, giving liberal effect to the principle that
equitable relief is proper if the legal remedy is not complete, practical, and efficient.2 Even if plaintiff asserts only the excessive nature of defendant's order
and raises no constitutional question, the case for equity jurisdiction would
seem to be just as great; there is "no logical difference •.• between unconstitutional human action and similar action without color of law therefor." 3 When
there is combined with this question of the validity of the statute ( or of its
scope) the multiplicity aspect presented by the principal case,4 the action would
1

Renegotiations Act, 1942, § 403{c){2), 50 U.S.C.A. (1944) § n91(c){2).
2 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 38 S.Ct. 529 (1918); Station WBT v.
Poulnot, (D.C. S.C. 1931) 46 F. (2d) 671; Simpson, "Fifty Years of American
Equity," 50 HARV. L. REv. 171 at 237 (1936). In some of the cases there was
involved an actual inquiry into the adequacy of the legal remedy: attacks on the constitutionality of statutes providing an administrative remedy which plaintiff had not
yet employed-Hegeman Farms Corp. v. Baldwin, 293 U.S. 163, 55 S.Ct. 7 (1934);
Anderson v. Schwellenbach, (D.C. Cal. 1947) 70 F. Supp. 14; statutes providing criminal sanctions {which equity has always been reluctant to restrain)--Spielman Motor
Sales v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89, 55 S.Ct. 678 (1935); or tax statutes {where a similar
reluctance has been displayed)-Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 52 S.Ct. 217
(1932).
8
Dissent in Hoffman Brewing Co. v. McElligott, (C.C.A. 2d, 1919) 259 F.
525 at 532, in which the court made a distinction between the two situations for the
purpose of determining whether the action was against the United States, and therefore
subject to the federal immunity to suit. Statements in other cases indicate that this
difference would not be found. Smith v. Tillitson, (C.C.A. 8th, 1928) 29 F. {2d)
535.
4
Under the preferred view, it is sufficient to sustain equity jurisdiction, if the
numerous suits at law involve only a common question of law or fact. Chafee, "Bills of
Peace with Multiple Parties," 45 HARV. L. REv. 1297 (1932). But there are many
courts which take the view that there must also be a common interest in the subject of
the action among all the parties to the suits at law. Georgia Power Co. v. Hudson,
(C.C.A. 4th, 1931) 49 F. (2d) 66; Mountain Lumber Co. v. Davis, (C.C.A. 2d,
1926) II F. (2d) 219. Since the action against each customer would be based on a
separate contract, courts following that doctrine might object to the present decision.
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seem to be within the familiar bounds of equity jurisdiction, at least in its procedural features. 5 There is a genuine multiplicity of serious proportions if plaintiff is to be compelled to sue all its contractors at law. It is immaterial that the.
parties to the actions the plaintiff seeks to void are not the same as the parties
to the equity action, so long as the act contemplated by the equity defendant
would give rise to such litigation. 6 The government's assurance that it would
intervene i!} the first suit between plaintiff and its customer and consider itself
bound by the outcome did not persuade the court that plaintiff should be required
to risk the possibility that the Secretary might, desire to relitigate the question in
the event of an unfavorable decision, although other courts have regarded such
assurance, or a presumption thereof, as sufficient to render the legal remedy
a~equate.7 Whether the Secretary acted to plaintiff's prejudice or violated any
duty to it in issuing the order would appear to be an additional question, inasmuch
as plaintiff's claims against its customers were unimpaired. 8 This aspect of
the case did not receive consideration by the court.
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5 In a previous suit to enjoin a similar order under the Renegotiation Act, the
Supreme Court denied jurisdiction on the ground that the action was against the
sovereign. Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371, 66 S.Ct. 219 (1945). The
case is distinguishable from the principal action, in that the order there was directed to
government disbursing officers, and the court considered the suit an attempt on the
part of the plaintiff to recover money owed it by the government. It appears well
settled that in the absence of such exceptional circumstances, a suit to enjoin a public
officer from acting under an unconstitutional statute will not be regarded as an action
against the sovereign. See the cases collected in 43 A.L.R. 408 (1926).
6 l PoMERoY, EQUITY JumsPRUDENcE, §§ 250, 261(1) (1941); Smyth v. Ames,
169 U.S. 466, 18 S.Ct. 418 (1898); Chicago City Ry. Co. v. City of Chicago,
(C.C. Ill. 1905) 142 F. 844; Ozark Bell Tel. Co. v. City of Springfield, (C.C. Mo.
1905) 140 F. 666. Language can be found, however, to the effect that there is a
basis for equity jurisdiction only when a multiplicity of suits between the same parties
would result. Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521, 52 S.Ct. 217 (1932); Chicago Ry.
Co. v. Bauman, (C.C.A. 8th, 1934) 69 F. ( 2d) 171; Pacific J'vfot. Life Ins. Co. v.
Parker, (C.C.A. 4th, 1934) 71 F. (2d) 872.
7 Equitable Guarantee & Trust Co. v. Donahoe, 8 Del. Ch. 422, 45 A. 583
(1900); Pacific Express Co. v. Seibert, (C.C. Mo. 1890) 44 F. 310.
8 In a very similar situation, where plaintiff sued his customers to enjoin payment
pursuant to the order, the Supreme Court denied the existence of any case or controversy on the ground that plaintiWs contract claims would remain valid and subsisting.
Coffman v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316, 65 S.Ct. 298 (1945).

